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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Murray asserted that the district court erred when it
dismissed claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to advise him of his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and
whether he should waive them before he pled guilty and participated in a court-ordered
domestic violence evaluation, and to inform him of his ability to obtain a confidential
domestic violence evaluation before deciding whether to plead guilty and participate in a
court-ordered evaluation. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Murray expressly asked the Idaho
Supreme Court to overrule the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Gonzales v. State,
151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011).
In response, the State makes a number of arguments, including an argument that
stare decisis dictates against consideration of Mr. Murray's request that the Idaho
Supreme Court overrule Gonzales, and an argument that Mr. Murray failed to establish
that he could have obtained a confidential evaluation prior to accepting the State's plea
offer.
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the two arguments identified above.
With respect to the State's other arguments, Mr. Murray will rely on the arguments and
authority set forth in his Appellant's Brief.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Murray's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
1.

Does the principle of stare decisis control Mr. Murray's request that the Idaho
Supreme Court overrule the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Gonzales v.
State?

2.

Has Mr. Murray failed to establish that he could have obtained a confidential
evaluation prior to accepting the State's plea offer?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The Principle Of Stare Decisis Does Not Control Mr. Murray's Request That The Idaho
Supreme Court Overrule The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Decision In Gonzales v. State

In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues,
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of
law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43
P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d
652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho
72,77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho
981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[P]rior decisions of this Court
should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time
to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d
801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, and being
presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the Court
is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52,
825 P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).
Murray has failed to meet his burden of showing Gonzales should be
overruled.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-11 (all punctuation and brackets in original).)
The State's argument is flawed for one important reason: the decisions of the
Idaho Court of Appeals are not binding upon the Idaho Supreme Court.

To hold

otherwise, and to accord decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals the protection of stare
decisis under such circumstances, would fundamentally alter the power and authority of

the Idaho Supreme Court to say what the law in Idaho is, binding the Idaho Supreme
Court to precedent from the Idaho Court of Appeals unless the parties, or the Idaho
Supreme Court itself, could demonstrate that the Idaho Court of Appeals' precedent
was "manifestly wrong, ... [had] proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
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overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." The Idaho Supreme Court should reject the State's attempt to limit
its power to overturn legal principles adopted by the Idaho Court of Appeals.

II.

Mr. Murray Has Established That He Could Have Obtained A Confidential Evaluation
Prior To Accepting The State's Plea Offer
In its Respondent's Brief, with respect to the issue of the confidential evaluation,
the State argues,
As noted, Murray has the burden of showing it would have been rational
under the circumstances to reject the plea offer. There is no evidence that
the plea offer allowed Murray to obtain his own private evaluation first or at
all. Rather, the offer required Murray to participate in a court-ordered
evaluation that would be available to the court at sentencing. Absent the
evaluation, there was no plea offer for Murray to accept or reject. Thus, it
is ultimately irrelevant whether Murray could or would have obtained his
own evaluation prior to entering his guilty plea. In other words, Murray's
claim that he would not have pled guilty "had he known ahead of time that
his evaluation would be so unfavorable" (Appellant's Brief, p.17), assumes
a factual predicate that does not exist, i. e., that the plea offer was
available to him regardless of his participation in the court-ordered
evaluation.
(Respondent's Brief, p.17.)
First, Mr. Murray will dispose of an argument that the State incorrectly asserts he
made by noting that he did not argue that the plea offer itself allowed him to obtain a
confidential evaluation prior to participating in the court-ordered evaluation. Mr. Murray
actually argued that his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could
have obtained his own confidential evaluation prior to accepting the State's plea offer.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) This argument is supported by Mr. Murray's testimony at
the evidentiary hearing that he first received word of the terms of the plea agreement on
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the day of his arraignment. (Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.12, L.15), which the record establishes
occurred on June 1, 2009 (R., p.94), and the fact that his guilty plea was not tendered
until July 13, 2009. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.6, L.2 - p.21, L.4.) Mr. Murray testified that,
had he been informed of his ability to obtain a confidential evaluation prior to pleading
guilty, he "probably" would have obtained one. 1 (Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.24, L.19.) In light of
this uncontradicted evidence in support of Mr. Murray's actual claim, he asserts that his
argument (unlike the one attributed to him by the State) does not assume a factual
predicate that did not exist.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in his Appellant's Brief and in this Reply Brief,
Mr. Murray respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing the claims from his petition for post-conviction relief discussed in his briefing,
and remand this matter to the district court for entry of a judgment in his favor on both
claims.
DATED this 2 nd day of January, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Nothing in the record demonstrates that it would have been impossible for Mr. Murray
to have obtained a confidential evaluation between his arraignment on June 1, 2009,
when he was first informed of the State's plea offer, and July 13, 2009, nearly six weeks
later, when he accepted the State's plea offer.
1
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